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NATURALLY SHED DNA: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
IMPLICATIONS IN THE TRAIL OF INTIMATE INFORMATION
WE ALL CANNOT HELP BUT LEAVE BEHIND
I.

INTRODUCTION

What if you were a suspect in a criminal investigation? An
alleged rape has confounded the state police for years, and after
looking into dozens of leads and suspects, troopers have exhausted
their options, hitting a dead end at every tum. Suddenly, they have a
new suspect: you. You agree to come in for questioning but refuse to
provide a DNA sample without a court-issued warrant. But the
moment you sit in that chair, police have all the DNA they need. Left
behind are millions of microscopic cells we all cannot help but
constantly shed. Police take swabs of those cells and analyze the
DNA.
A few years ago, the government could not carry out such a
strategy; the technology was not advanced enough. I Today, they can
and they do. They did it to Glenn Joseph Raynor, a forty-year-old
man from Forest Hill/ a rural hamlet in northern Maryland. 3 A jury
convicted Raynor of first-degree rape, second-degree rape, first- and
second-degree sex offenses, and burglary, among other charges, and a
judge sentenced Raynor to 100 years in prison. 4 Without the DNA
evidence, the State had no case. 5
The DNA evidence should have been suppressed because it
violated the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 6 Courts have consistently decided that when a
person leaves DNA on an object and then discards that object, the
person abandons not only the object but also his DNA, and police are

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

See Erika Butler, Man Facing Life for Rape Conviction, THE AEGIS, June 17, 2009, at
AI.
See id.
21050 Zip Code Profile, NEIGHBORHOOD LINK, http;llneighborhoodlink.comlzip
/21050 (last visited Dec. 1,2011).
Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Worksheet, Maryland v. Raynor, No. 12K08l527
(Har. Cir. Ct. Sept. 1, 2009).
See Butler, supra note 1.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (noting the judicial adoption of
the exclusionary rule to preserve Fourth Amendment rights).
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free to take and analyze that DNA without a warrant. 7 But courts
have never faced the question of whether a person abandons DNA by
shedding it with little or no action or intention. s Collection and
analysis of such "naturally shed DNA,,9 implicates the Fourth
Amendment and demands a per se reasonable expectation of privacy.
Raynor's case was one of first impression in Maryland and the rest
of the country. to With cases like Raynor's, courts will finally be
forced to confront the issue of how recent technological
improvements in DNA analysis implicate the Fourth Amendment.
This comment aims to present and analyze the Fourth Amendment
issues involved when the government seizes and analyzes naturally
shed DNA, and in particular, whether advancements in technology
call for a new approach to the abandonment doctrine. II Part II
explains the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and how
courts thus far have approached DNA analysis in the Fourth
Amendment context. 12 Part III explains why naturally shed DNA
represents a unique challenge for courts and is different from
fingerprints and the DNA evidence considered in past cases. 13 Part
IV proposes a solution-a statute declaring a per se reasonable
expectation of privacy in naturally shed DNA. 14

7.

8.
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See, e.g., Williamson v. State, 413 Md. 521, 535-37, 993 A.2d 626, 634-35 (2010)
(obtaining DNA from a cup from which the suspect drank during questioning and
subsequently left behind); Commonwealth v. Bly, 862 N.E.2d 341, 356-57 (Mass.
2007) (obtaining DNA from cigarette butts and a water bottle left after an interview
with police); State v. Athan, 158 PJd 27,37 (Wash. 2007) (setting up a ruse to obtain
DNA from an envelope the suspect licked).
Brief of Appellant at 2-3, Raynor v. State, No. 01629 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 16,
2010).
"Naturally shed DNA" refers to genetic material that all people naturally slough off,
even without any movement. It also includes, for instance, DNA shed when a
person's skin rubs against another's clothing or skin. See discussion infra Part III.
See Brief of Appellant, supra note 8, at 2-3.
See discussion infra Parts III and IV.
See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part IV.
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II.

DNA ANALYSIS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: THE
CURRENT APPROACH

A.

DNA Analysis: A Quickly Advancing Crime-Fighting Technique

With recent advances in technology, DNA analysis has grown
extraordinarily prevalent as a crime-fighting too1. 15 Police have huge
incentives to use DNA evidence because the analysis is nearly
conclusive and the DNA is easily obtainable. 16
In 1985, an English researcher first discovered that DNA could be
used to fight crime. 17 A year later, DNA analysis was introduced in
the United States. 18 At the time, the technique met stiff criticism
from the media, legal experts, and the scientific community,19 but it
quickly overcame this skepticism and went on to revolutionize
forensic science. 2o There are four methods of analyzing DNA, each
extremely complex and with its own advantages and disadvantages
for different types of cases. 21 Today, more than 150 public forensic

15.

16.
17.

18.

19.

20.
21.

Donald E. Shelton, Twenty-First Century Forensic Science Challenges for Trial
Judges in Criminal Cases: Where the "Polybutadiene" Meets the "Bitumen", 18
WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 309,310 (2009).
Id. at 320.
Alec J. Jeffreys, John F.Y. Brookfield & Robert Semeonoff, Positive Identification of
an immigration Test-Case Using Human DNA Fingerprints, NATURE, Oct. 31, 1985,
at 818.
NORAH RUDIN & KEITH INMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS 25
(2d ed. 2002).
See, e.g., MaIjorie Maguire Shultz, Reasons for Doubt: Legal Issues in the Use of
DNA Identification Techniques, in DNA ON 'TRIAL: GENETIC IDENTIFICATION AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 19, 19-21 (paul R. Billings ed., 1992); Janet C. Hoeffel, Note, The
Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal
Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REv. 465, 465-66 (1990); Gina Kolata, Some Scientists Doubt
the Value of 'Genetic Fingerprint' Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1990, at AI.
See JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY AND GENETICS
OF STR MARKERS 2-3 (2d ed. 2005).
NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REpORT No. 194197, USING
DNA TO SOLVE COLD CASES 6-7 (2002). Polymerase Chain Reaction analysis
replicates copies of an extremely small sample of DNA without affecting the original,
allowing scientists to analyze DNA from degraded evidence as long as the DNA itself
is not contaminated. Id. Short Tandem Repeat analysis examines thirteen specific
regions, or loci, on DNA to identify an individual, providing a core set of loci for
government databases to use to compare and match people's DNA.
Id.
Mitochondrial analysis is useful in cold cases because it analyzes DNA from a
different part of the cell than what the other analyses use, so when blood or semen is
too degraded to analyze, mitochondrial analysis can analyze DNA from bone or a hair
shaft. Id. Y -chromosome analysis targets genetic markers on only the male portion of
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laboratories and several dozen private paternity-testing laboratories in
the United States conduct hundreds of thousands of DNA tests every
year.22
Scientists are constantly making new strides in DNA research. In
2003, they completed mapping the entire human genome. 23 With
continued research, scientists will soon be able to use DNA to unlock
information about a person's heredity, health, propensity for diseases,
and perhaps even tendencies to act in certain ways.24 DNA can
already be used to trace a person's family history/s and an identical
twin can be identified using the other twin's DNA. 26
In addition, scientists in recent years have been able to analyze
DNA using fewer cells than ever before. 27 When a suspect handles a
gun in a shooting or touches the steering wheel of a stolen car, for
instance, police can collect the microscopic cells left behind to
analyze the DNA. 28 Experts have coined such DNA samples "touch
DNA.,,29
DNA analysis is extremely complex. 30 Short tandem repeat
analysis, the most common method of DNA analysis in criminal
investigations, examines thirteen specific regions-so-called "junk
DNA"-that solely identify a person. 31 When scientists conduct the
analysis, they first run a test to identify a DNA sequence and make

22.
23.
24.
25.

26.
27.

28.
29.

30.
31.

a biological sample and is helpful in differentiating between multiple male
contributors to the same DNA sample. Id.
BUTLER, supra note 20, at 3.
2003: Human Genome Project Completed, NAT'L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST.,
http://www.genome.gov/25520492 (last updated Oct. 4, 2010).
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 842 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004).
Mitochondrial analysis can uncover a person's maternal family history, and Ychromosome analysis can trace family history among males. See NAT'L INST. OF
JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 7.
Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming "Abandoned" DNA: The Fourth Amendment and
Genetic Privacy, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 857, 858 n.5 (2006).
Mark Nelson, Making Sense of DNA Backlogs - Myths vs. Reality, 266 NIJ J. 20, 21
(2010), available at https:llwww.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesllnij/230409.pdf.
Id. at 22.
See id. Touch DNA gained prominence when it was used in the case of JonBenet
Ramsey, the child beauty queen whose 1996 murder captivated the country. Kirk
Johnson, New DNA Technology Clears the Family of JonBenet Ramsey, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10,2008, at A19. Investigators analyzed DNA scraped from the waistband of the
long johns Ramsey wore the night she was killed. Id. The discovery exonerated
Ramsey's family members, who had been living amid suspicions that they killed the
girl. Id.
Williamson v. State, 413 Md. 521, 551 n.3, 993 A.2d 626, 644 n.3 (2010) (Bell, C.J.,
dissenting).
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2004).
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sure the DNA is human. 32 The DNA is then run through a machine
called a thermocycler, which spends two and a half hours creating
millions of copies of the DNA. 33 Tubes of the DNA are then placed
in a genetic analyzer, and the number of repeated patterns on the
thirteen sites is measured. 34 The results are put into a computer to
produce an image of colored wave bands showing the repeated
patterns. 35
Police have significant motives to obtain and analyze DNA. The
technique's results are nearly indisputable, ensuring that guilty
parties are found guilty and innocent ones go free. 36 The chances that
short tandem repeat analysis, for example, will identify the wrong
person can be as minute as one in one billion. 37
B.

Katz and the Changing Contours of the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable
searches and seizures,38 and warrantless searches or seizures are per
se unreasonable. 39 A warrant is required so police officers, who may
be acting in good faith but are embroiled in an investigation, do not
make decisions about whether there is probable cause to invade
someone's reasonable privacy expectations. 40 A neutral and detached
judicial officer must make that determination. 41

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

39.

40.

41.

Williamson, 413 Md. at 551 n.3, 993 A.2d at 644 n.3 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
ld.
ld.
ld.
See NAT'L IN ST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 6.
ld.
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The Fourth Amendment is
composed of two clauses, the warrant clause and the reasonableness clause. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. The warrant requirement has exceptions, but the reasonableness
clause always applies. Katz, 389 U.S. at 356-57.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) ("The point of the Fourth
Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from
evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise offerreting out crime.").
ld.
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To implicate the Fourth Amendment, in general, the government
must conduct a search or seizure of something in which a person
maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy. 42
That basic
framework has remained unchanged, but advancing technology over
the past couple decades has forced courts to face more complex
questions about the Amendment's applicability. 43 The Founders
relied on the maxim that a man's home is his castle, and courts have
traditionally analyzed Fourth Amendment issues by considering
whether government agents physically intruded into an area in which
a person maintained a reasonable expectation ofprivacy.44
In United States v. Katz,45 the Supreme Court departed from its
traditional analysis. The case, decided in 1967, involved the
government's electronic surveillance of a suspect who was illegally
transmitting wagering information from a public phone booth.46 The
FBI placed an electronic listening and recording device on the outside
of the booth and argued that because it was public and open to the
public's view, the suspect did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy over his communications. 47 Faced with the new technology,
the Court rejected the idea of constitutionally protected areas. 48 The
Court held that the government violated the Fourth Amendment
because the Amendment does not protect places, it protects people
and their expectations ofprivacy.49
To maintain Fourth Amendment protection, a person must not
only have a privacy expectation, that expectation must be
reasonable. 50 To determine the reasonableness of a person's privacy
expectations, Katz established a two-prong test: a person must exhibit
a subjective expectation of privacy, and that expectation must be one
42.
43.

44.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

50.

Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that the
warrantless use of a GPS device to track defendant's movements twenty-four hours a
day over a period of twenty-eight days constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064.
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914); Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("[W]el\ into the 20th century, our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass.").
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
ld. at 348-49
ld. at 352.
ld. at 351-52.
ld.; see also United States v. Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d 384, 389 (D. Mass. 2010)
("Because the Fourth Amendment 'protects people, not places,' the courts have
tended to de-emphasize physical boundaries and have focused instead on whether the
area intruded upon provided any privacy associated with the home." (quoting Katz,
389 U.S. at 351)).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 51 What a person
knowingly exposes to the public does not warrant the protections of
the Fourth Amendment, but what a person seeks to keep private, even
in a public area, can be constitutionally protected. 52
Since Katz, the Court has dealt with advancing technology by
consistently reinforcing its shift away from a place-focused analysis.
In Kyllo v. United States,53 police used thennal imaging to measure
the heat emanating from a house and determine if the residents were
cultivating marijuana with the help of high-intensity lamps.54 The
Court held that the police violated the Fourth Amendment. 55 When
the government conducts a search by using specialized technology to
perceive what it otherwise could not, and when that search invades a
person's home, it is unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 56 The Court held that people always have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their homes by applying Katz's two-prong
test. 57 In the home, "there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the
common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and
that is acknowledged to be reasonable.,,58
C.

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement

When a person maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy over
something, the warrant requirement mandates that the government
obtain a warrant before invading that privacy. 59 But the warrant
requirement has several well-delineated exceptions, such as the

51.
52.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

59.

Id.
Id. at 351 (majority opinion).
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Id. at 29.
Jd. at 40.
Id.
Jd. at 34-39.
!d. at 34. Certain details in a home are more intimate than others, and residents surely
would not mind the government's knowing some less private details, but the Court
determined that limiting its holding to only truly intimate details would be
impractical. Jd. at 38-39. Only after a search has been conducted can police know
the type of information uncovered by the search. Jd.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
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automobile exception and the inventory search.60 Similarly, searches
of abandoned objects do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. 61
When people abandon an item, they relinquish any privacy
expectation they may have had in that item. 62 The government can
then search or seize the abandoned item without a warrant, while
complying with the Constitution. 63 In the Fourth Amendment
context, abandonment is determined by an objective analysis of act
and intent. 64 This includes a consideration of the person's actions,
words, and all other relevant circumstances at the time of the alleged
abandonment. 65
The abandonment exception illustrates the evolution of Fourth
Amendment analysis. 66 In the past, property law had a place in
Fourth Amendment analysis. 67 Courts determined that a search
required a physical trespass. 68 Today, that analysis is different, and
the Amendment's applicability turns on whether a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy over the item or place searched. 69
Similarly, abandonment in the Fourth Amendment context is distinct
from abandonment in the property law sense.
Property law
abandonment focuses on whether a person has given up formal
property rights, such as title or possession. 70 Fourth Amendment
abandonment, on the other hand, questions whether a person has
maintained a reasonable privacy expectation over the item at issue. 71

60.

61.

See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1717 (2009) (explaining search incident to
a lawful arrest); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61-62 (1967) (explaining the
inventory search); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (explaining the
automobile exception).
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217,241 (1960).

62.
63.

ld.
ld.

64.

United States v. Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d 630, 648 (D. Md. 2009).

65.

ld.

66.

67.

Compare Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (explaining that property law
was tied to Fourth Amendment analysis well into the twentieth century), with
Williamson v. State, 413 Md. 521, 535, 993 A.2d 626, 635 (2010) ("The test for
determining whether property is abandoned for purposes of the Fourth Amendment
differs from the property law concept of abandonment and instead, focuses on
whether the owner of the property retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
property .... ").
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31.

68.
69.

ld.
ld.

70.
71.

ld.

Williamson, 413 Md. at 535,993 A.2d at 635.
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The seminal case on abandonment is California v. Greenwood. 72
In that case, the Court held that the defendants abandoned their

garbage when they placed it in opaque bags for collection by the trash
collector. 73 The Court accepted that the defendants had a subjective
privacy expectation but refused to recognize that expectation as
reasonable. 74 By placing the garbage in public where any person or
animal could easily gain access to it, the defendants sufficiently
exposed the trash to the public and relinquished any reasonable
privacy expectation. 75
A number of courts have considered the abandonment of DNA.
Despite the intimate infonnation contained in DNA, courts have held
that people can abandon their genetic material in a Fourth
Amendment context. 76 Courts have upheld "covert DNA sampling,"
a technique often used by police to obtain a suspect's DNA without a
warrant. The government waits for a person to discard genetic
material before gathering the evidence without the person's
knowledge. 77 ,In Commonwealth v. Cabral, for instance, the
Massachusetts Appeals Court held that police legally obtained a
defendant's DNA because the defendant abandoned the genetic
material when he spit onto a public sidewalk. 78
Of these abandonment cases, many involve a suspect leaving
DNA on an object before abandoning that object. Courts have held
that by abandoning the objects, the suspects also abandoned their
DNA. 79 In Williamson v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that a rape suspect abandoned his DNA when he drank from a
cup and left the cup in the police interrogation room. 80 In State v.
Athan, the Supreme Court of Washington went so far as to condone a
ruse orchestrated by police to obtain DNA left on an object. Police
sent the defendant a letter inviting him to join a class-action lawsuit
and obtained the defendant's DNA from saliva left on the envelope

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

77.
78.
79.
80.

486 U.S. 35,39--40 (1988).
ld.
ld.
ld. at 40.
See Williamson, 413 Md. at 546-47, 993 A.2d at 641 (2010); Commonwealth v.
Cabral, 866 N.E.2d 429 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007); State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 33-34
(Wash. 2007).
See Williamson, 413 Md. at 546-47,993 A.2d at 641.
Cabral, 866 N.E.2d at 430-31.
See, e.g., Williamson, 413 Md. at 546, 993 A.2d at 641.
ld. at 528, 993 A.2d at 630.
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after the defendant mailed back the paperwork.8f The court held that
the defendant abandoned his DNA along with the envelope. 82
III. NATURALLY SHED DNA IS DIFFERENT
Courts have made clear that people can abandon their DNA. 83
None of the above cases, however, dealt with naturally shed DNA.
In fact, no court has decided whether the Fourth Amendment applies
to DNA a person cannot help but shed. 84 In exploring that question,
the analysis turns to whether naturally shed DNA can be considered
sufficiently similar to the DNA and other items found to have been
abandoned in past cases.

A.

Naturally Shed DNA Implicates the Fourth Amendment

1.

People Maintain a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in
Naturally Shed DNA

The first step in that analysis is to determine if people maintain a
reasonable expectation of privacy in naturally shed DNA. 85 Under
Katz, if a person has a subjective privacy expectation that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable, the government must have a
warrant to conduct a search or seizure. 86
The first prong of the test, whether a person exhibited a subjective
privacy expectation, turns on the specific facts of each instance and is
difficult to determine in a general manner. 87 Since the test's
conception, courts and commentators have criticized the test as
circular and counseled against placing too much emphasis on this
prong. 88 About a decade after Katz, the Court stated that a SUbjective
exhibition of privacy, at least in some situations, would provide an
"inadequate index of Fourth Amendment protection.,,89 Even Justice

81.

82.
83.
84.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Athan,158P.3dat31.
Id. at 33-34.
See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
See Brief of Appellant, supra note 8, at 2. In September 2011, the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland issued an opinion in Raynor's case. Raynor v. State, No. 1629,
2011 WL 4495663 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Sept. 29, 2011). The court in Raynor
determined that it was bound by the case of Williamson v. State, 413 Md. 521,993
A.2d 626 (2010), in which the Court of Appeals held that a suspect abandoned his
DNA by abandoning a cup from which he drank. Raynor, 2011 WL 4495663, at *7.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).
Id. at 741 n.5; 1 WAYNE LAfAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(d), at 394 (3d ed. 1996).
Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 n.5.
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Harlan, who first described the test,90 stated that Fourth Amendment
analysis "must
transcend the search for subjective
expectations .... ,,91 Still, the Court has never explicitly removed the
prong.
The subjective-privacy-expectation requirement and naturally shed
DNA make an inherently awkward fit. People are hardly aware that
they are constantly shedding microscopic cells containing DNA, and
they do not go around thinking about the trail of DNA left behind. 92
No one can exhibit a privacy expectation in something they do not
even know they are at risk of abandoning, yet that is exactly what this
prong requires. 93 Even if people are aware of their naturally shed
skin cells, they would have to take fanatical measures to demonstrate
a subjective privacy expectation in those cells. 94 They would have to
wear a body suit at all times to keep from leaving cells everywhere,
or they would have to carry around cleaning materials to wipe down
every place they gO.95 Because naturally shed DNA cannot cleanly fit
the first prong of the Katz test, the prong provides an inadequate
index and courts should always consider that the prong has been
met. 96 Indeed, "[c]ourts addressing whether DNA analysis comports
with the Fourth Amendment in other contexts seem to operate on the
premise that individuals always have a subjective expectation of
privacy in their DNA .... ,,97
Thus, the question becomes, does society recognize privacy
expectations in naturally shed DNA to be reasonable?98 There is
ample evidence that it does.
90.
9l.
92.
93.
94.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues,
76 WASH. L. REv. 413, 437-38 (2001).
See id.
Id.
Depositing paper in the trash is generally a volitional act.
Someone intent on preserving the secrecy of the papers can shred
the papers or dispose of them in other ways that would defeat
normal police surveillance. . .. The deposition of DNA in public
places cannot be avoided unless one is a hermit or is fanatical in
using extraordinary containment measures.
Id.
See id.
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 n.5 (1979).
United States v. Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d 630,645 (D. Md. 2009).
See Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 92, at 438. Illustrating the circular nature of the
test, it is reasonable to assume that a person would have a subjective privacy
expectation if the rest of society deems that expectation to be reasonable, even if the
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DNA contains extremely personal information. 99 The type of
information contained in DNA includes information about a person's
health, vulnerability to certain diseases, and propensity for certain
conduct; further scientific research is sure to make DNA even more
revealing. lOo Research is already beginning to show that short tandem
repeat analysis, generally thought to have the capacity to unlock only
a person's identity, can reveal more private information, such as a
person's vulnerability to diabetes. lol Courts have stated that if DNA
analysis was advanced enough to show information beyond mere
identity, they would reconsider holding that people do not maintain a
reasonable expectation of privacy in DNA, even DNA that is
intentionally and voluntarily discarded. 102
The intimate nature of this information is obvious. It is at least as
private as the type of information contained in medical records, and
many states recognize a cause of action for the unauthorized
disclosure of such information. l03 Suits for violations of doctorpatient confidentiality rest on the grounds that the disclosure invaded
the patient's privacy. 104
Police are supposed to use the DNA to determine only a person's
identity,105 but that is of no consequence. Unlike fingerprints, DNA
analysis opens people up to the possibility that the government will
unreasonably learn intimate details about them.106 The question is
whether society recognizes as reasonable a privacy expectation in
such information, not whether police will use DNA to only identify a

individual has not done anything to show the subjective expectation. LAF AYE, supra
note 88, § 2.1(c), at 386-87, § 2.1(d), at 390-91.
99.
See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 842 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J.,
concurring).
100. Id. at 842 & n.3.
101. Justin Gillis, Genetic Code of Mouse Published: Comparison with Human Genome
Indicates "Junk DNA" May Be Vital, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2002, at Al (reporting that
new advances may force scientists to abandon the term '~unk DNA"); David Concar,
Fingerprint Fear, NEW SCIENTIST (May 2, 2001, 7:00 PM), http://www.newscientist.
com/articJe/dn694-fingerprint-fear.html (explaining that the "junk" DNA used in short
tandem repeat analysis provides a link to a person's susceptibility to type 1 diabetes).
102. See, e.g., Williamson v. State, 413 Md. 521, 543, 993 A.2d 626,639 (2010) ("While
there may be debate regarding privacy concerns should technological advances permit
testing of DNA to glean more information from acquired DNA than mere
identification, that debate does not have 'feet' in the present case.").
103. 61 AM. JUR. 20 Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 148 (2011).
104. See Concar, supra note 101.
105. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-503 (LexisNexis 2011).
106. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 842 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J.,
concurring).
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person. 107 Society has shown a discomfort and distrust in placing
DNA in the hands of the government. 108 A number of states have
enacted laws protecting the privacy of DNA, illustrating society's
recognition of a reasonable privacy expectation in DNA.l09 The laws
declare that an individual's DNA is the private property of that
individual and protect the DNA from misuse in genetic testing. 110
They do not necessarily bar courts from holding that naturally shed
DNA is abandoned, but they do prevent misuse of genetic material in
DNA databases. 111 The passage of these statutes shows that society is
prepared to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in DNA. 112
Furthermore, even if officials use DNA only as an identifier, it is
not unique to one person. 1l3 Analysts can identify an identical twin
using the other twin's DNA, and although it may seem far-fetched to
imagine an evil twin framing another for a crime, such scenarios have
happened. 114
2.

Taking and Analyzing Naturally Shed DNA Constitutes a Search

The next question in determining the Fourth Amendment's
applicability is whether the government's actions constitute a

107.

108.
lO9.

110.

111.

112.

113.

Even the Raynor court recognized the distinction between what personal information
the government is legally permitted to obtain and the privacy expectation people
maintain nevertheless. Raynor v. State, No. 1629, 2011 WL 4495663, at *6 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. Sept. 29, 2011). The court discussed a statutory restriction against the
testing of DNA for information unrelated to identification before stating that "those
protections, of course, are little comfort to those who do not believe that the State
should have such information at its disposal in the first place." Id.
See Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652,670 (2d Cir. 2005).
COLO. REv. STAT. § 1O-3-1104.7(l)(a) (20lO); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760AO(2)(a)
(LexisNexis 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(1) (2011); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
22:213.7(E) (2011).
COLO. REv. STAT. § 1O-3-1lO4.7(l)(a) (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760AO(2)(a)
(LexisNexis 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1 (2011); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
22: 1023(E) (2011).
COLO. REv. STAT. § 1O-3-1104.7(l)(a) (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760AO(2)(a)
(LexisNexis 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1 (2011); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
22: 1023(E) (2011).
See COLO. REv. STAT. § 1O-3-1104.7(1)(a) (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760AO(2)(a)
(LexisNexis 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1 (2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22: 1023 (E) (2011).
See The Prisoner's Dilemma, Evil Twin Edition, FREAKONOMICS (Mar. 24, 2009, 2:06
PM), http://www.freakonornics.coml2009/03/24/the-prisoners-dilemma-evil-twin
-edition!.

114. Id.
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search. ll5 In general, taking and analyzing DNA IS considered a
search under the Fourth Amendment. 116
In Schmerber v. California, the taking of a blood sample was
Surely there is a reasonable privacy
considered a search.117
expectation when a person's body is physically intruded upon, but
Katz held that physical areas are not the focus of the Fourth
Amendment's protections. 118 Rather, the Amendment protects those
things in which people have a subjective expectation of privacy, so
long as society is prepared to recognize that expectation as
reasonable. 119 Thus, physical intrusion is not necessary to make the
collection of DNA a search; the privacy invasion comes from
obtaining the DNA and the vast amount of personal information
contained therein. 120
That police may collect only a few cells makes no difference. 121
Collecting and analyzing DNA is a search because of the private
information revealed by the analysis,122 and thanks to advancing
technology, a large amount of cells is no longer needed to conduct
that analysis. 123 The Amendment looks to the qualitative, not
quantitative, nature of the search.124 When police obtain and analyze
only a few cells, they learn the same information as if they used a
great many more cells. 125 The qualitative nature of the search has not
changed, and that is what matters. 126
In holding unconstitutional the government's thermal imaging
surveillance of a home, the Kyllo Court emphasized how the
technology was not generally available to the pUblic.127 The Court
also spent considerable time discussing how the state could not use
115. See United States v. Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d 630, 643 (D. Md. 2009).
116. See id. at 644.
117. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
118. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). This, of course, is not to say that
people do not maintain a high expectation of privacy in areas like their homes. People
maintain a very high expectation of privacy in their homes, but that is justified by the
Katz test. People generally have a subjective privacy expectation in their homes, and
society recognizes that expectation as reasonable. See Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 34-37 (2001).
119. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
120. See Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 647-50; State v. Martin, 955 A.2d 1144, 1151 (Vt.
2008).
121. See United States v. Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d 384, 393 (D. Mass. 2010).
122. Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 657-58.
123. See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 6.
124. See Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 392-93.
125. See NAT'LlNST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 6.
126. See Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 392-93.
127. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34, 40 (2001).
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the technology without intruding on legal activities as well as illegal
activities. 128 Both points hold true when considering the technology
used in DNA analysis. The general public clearly has no access to
the technology used to collect and analyze naturally shed DNA, and
before police use the technology, they cannot know for sure whether
they are invading the privacy of someone who has engaged in illegal
activities or someone who has engaged in only legal activities. 129
The Court in Kyllo based its decision in large part on how thermal
imaging technology had no analogue in the time when the Fourth
Amendment was created. 130 Some investigatory techniques, such as
dog sniffs, do have such an analogue. 131 Even in Katz, the dissent
found such an analogue. 132 Although the Founders could not have
foreseen the listening device at issue in Katz, there was an analogue
because at the time of the Fourth Amendment's adoption, people
could eavesdrop and overhear other people's conversations. 133 But
the Founders could not have known that law enforcement would
some day have the technology to use heat to see into a person's
home. 134 In the same way, the Founders could never have fathomed
that the government would have the technology to analyze a person's
genetic material. 135 There was no analogue for DNA analysis when
the Fourth Amendment was created. 136
Courts have held that taking DNA is one search and analyzing it is
another,137 but distinguishing between the two is a moot point. 138
Merely possessing the DNA serves no purpose in an investigation. 139
128. Jd. at 38.
129. See Williamson v. State, 413 Md. 521, 551 n.3, 993 A.2d 626, 644 n.3 (2010) (Bell,
C.J., dissenting).
130. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-40.
131. United States v. Broadway, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1190-91 (D. Colo. 2008).
132. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,366 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
133. Jd.
134. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-40.
135. See id.
136. See Joh, supra note 26, at 868-73 (explaining that there are not even modem
analogies to DNA analysis).
137. United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73,77 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Davis, 657
F. Supp. 2d 630, 647 (D. Md. 2009); United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597,
600 (W.D. Pa. 2009), rev'd on other grounds, No. 09-4718,2011 WL 3086952 (3d
CiT. 2011); Statev. Martin, 955 A.2d 1144,1151 (VI. 2008).
138. Williamson v. State, 413 Md. 521, 551 n.3, 993 A.2d 626,644 n.3 (2010) (Bell, C.J.,
dissenting) ("Although acquiring DNA is separate and distinct from its analysis and
testing, they are critically inextricably related. The acquisition of DNA without
analyzing it is virtually meaningless.").
139. Jd.
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The only reason to have the DNA is to analyze it and find out the
infonnation contained within. 140 The possession and analysis are
"critically inextricably related.,,141

B.

Naturally Shed DNA Presents a New Problem for Abandonment
Analysis

When the government, without a warrant, conducts a search or
seizure that invades a person's reasonable expectation of privacy, the
government's actions are presumptively unconstitutional. 142 But that
is just a presumption. 143 If one of the few exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment applies, and the government has probable cause to
believe that the search or seizure will reveal evidence of a crime, the
government's conduct may be justifiable.
1.

Naturally Shed DNA Is Different From Abandoned DNA in Past
Cases

Abandonment is an exception to the warrant requirement. 144
People abandon something when, based on an objective analysis of
act and intent, they relinquish all privacy expectations in an item. 145
Past cases have held that a person can abandon DNA by leaving
DNA on an object before abandoning the object. 146 This type of
DNA is referred to as "touch DNA.,,147 A person may also abandon
DNA by voluntarily and intentionally discarding DNA, for instance
by spitting on a public sidewalk. 148
But naturally shed DNA is different from the DNA at issue in
those cases. 149 In those cases, people took some type of voluntary
action to leave their DNA. 150 DNA is left on a cup, for instance,
when a person voluntarily and intentionally drinks from the cup, even
though the person is probably not thinking about leaving DNA at that

140.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-87 (1980).
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217,241 (1960).
United States v. Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d 630, 648 (D. Md. 2009).
See, e.g., Williamson, 413 Md. at 544-47,993 A.2d at 640-41 (citing Commonwealth
v. Bly, 862 N.E.2d. 341, 356-57 (Mass. 2007); State v. Wickline, 440 N.W.2d 249,
253-54 (Neb. 1989); State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27,33-34 (Wash. 2007)).
"Touch DNA" is the term coined for the relatively small amount of skin cells that
people leave on an item after touching that item. Nelson, supra note 27, at 22.
Commonwealth v. Cabral, 866 N.E.2d 429,433 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 649.
See, e.g., Williamson, 413 Md. at 544-47, 993 A.2d at 640-41.
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time. lSI The voluntariness is even more apparent in the situation
involving a person's spitting on the sidewalk. The person clearly
takes a voluntary, intentional action to expel his saliva to the
ground. 152
A person can do nothing, however, to avoid leaving naturally shed
DNA. 153 No voluntariness or intention is required. 154 A person's
clothing could rub against his skin, or someone else could bump into
the person to slough off that person's skin cells. 155 Moreover, people
constantly shed dead skin cells, even without any movement at all. I56
People shed between 30,000 and 40,000 skin cells every minute. 157
This constant shedding can create a public hodgepodge of genetic
material that makes DNA analysis less conclusive than one might
initially think. 158 A person's DNA can be spread by people on whom
the DNA was shed, and an item or area can contain the DNA of more
than one person. 159 To further complicate matters, the person who
has the largest amount of DNA on an object or in an area may not be
the one who should be primarily linked with that object or area. 160
People shed DNA at different rates. 161 When the government
analyzes a trail of naturally shed DNA, therefore, they may not
identify the perpetrator, just the person who left the most cells or
shed them the fastest. But DNA, with its aura of infallibility, can still
deliver convictions to prosecutors, even if they target the wrong
person. 162

151. Id.
152. Cabral, 866 N.E.2d at 433.
153. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 92, at 437-38.
154. Id.
155. See Kevin Johnson, 'Touch'DNA Offers Hope in Cold Investigations, USA TODAY,
(Sept. 23, 2008, 1:01 AM), http://www.usatoday.comltechlscience/2008-09-22touchdna N.htm.

156. See Ed Grabianowski, How Many Skin Cells Do You Shed Every Day?, DISCOVERY
FIT & HEALTH, http://health.howstuffworks.comlskin-care/informationlanatomy/shedskin-cells.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2011) (explaining that dead skin cells constantly
fall off as new cells are generated to take their place).

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
See ALAN GUNN, ESSENTIAL FORENSIC BIOLOGY 103 (2d ed. 2009).
Id.
See id.
Id.
See Jonathan 1. Koehler, Error and Exaggeration in the Presentation of DNA
Evidence at Trial, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 21, 23-24 (1993).
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Naturally Shed DNA Is Different from Fingerprints

Many legal experts liken DNA analysis to fingerprint analysis,
contending it is nothing more than another way to determine the
identity of criminals. 163 Indeed, DNA was initially called the "genetic
fingerprint." 164 Fingerprints are unique to each person, providing an
effective, accurate, and long-accepted method of fighting crime. 165
They generally do not implicate the Fourth Amendment, however,
because they are akin to physical characteristics and exposed to the
public's view. 166 One reason that courts have rejected nearly every
legal challenge to the federal and state databases storing the DNA of
convicted criminals is that the information stored in the databases is
limited to the same information that can be gleaned from a
fingerprint: the suspect's identity.167
Naturally shed DNA, however, IS vastly different from
fingerprints. Courts have held that people have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in their physical characteristics 168 or in what
they knowingly expose to the public's view. 169 Fingerprint analysis
requires a simple lifting and comparison of oil ridges, which can be
visible to the naked eye. l7O Naturally shed skin cells are hardly

163. See State v. Raines, 383 Md. 1,25,857 A.2d 19,33 (2004).
164. See id. at 73,857 A.2d at 62-63 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
165. Simon A. Cole, Fingerprint Identification and the Criminal Justice System: Historical
Lessons for the DNA Debate, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE
TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 63, 67 (David Lazer ed., 2004).
166. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973) (comparing fingerprinting to the
analysis of other physical characteristics, such as voice exemplars, which do not
implicate the Fourth Amendment and do not involve probing into a person's private
life).
167. See Raines, 383 Md. at 12, 857 A.2d at 25. The Ninth Circuit struck down a DNA
collection statute in United States v. Kincade, but the court reheard the issue en banc
and reversed, upholding the statute. United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir.
2003), rev'd en bane, 379 F.3d 813 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 924 (2005). In
United States v. Weikert, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
granted a defendant's motion to suppress evidence collected in accordance with a
DNA statute, but on appeal, the First Circuit reversed. United States v. Weikart, 421
F. Supp. 2d 259 (D. Mass. 2006), rev'd, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007). In 2007, the
Massachusetts District Court granted the same motion in United States v. Stewart, but
the First Circuit again reversed. United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D.
Mass. 2007), rev'd, 532 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2008).
168. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973) (compelling a witness to furnish a
handwriting exemplar does not implicate the Fourth Amendment); Dionisio, 410 U.S.
at 13-14 (requiring witness to give a voice exemplar is not a search or seizure under
the Fourth Amendment).
169. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
170. United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 221 (3d Cir. 2004).
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similar. 171 DNA in skin cells may contain information about a
person's physical characteristics, and DNA is microscopic, requiring
a complex analysis to unlock the information contained therein. 172
Perhaps the most cited distinction between DNA and fingerprints
is the far greater amount of far more personal information contained
in DNA.173 The government can determine only a person's identity
from a fingerprint. 174 With DNA, researchers will soon be able to
unlock information about a person's heredity, health, propensity for
diseases, and perhaps even tendencies to act in certain ways.175 DNA
can already be used to trace a person's family history,176 and
scientists can identify an identical twin using the other twin's
DNA.177 DNA information is similar to that protected by state
statutory and common law privacy laws. 178
DNA analysis is also much more intricate than fingerprint
analysis. 179 Fingerprint analysis requires a simple comparison.
Investigators compare oil marks left by a finger's ridges with a print
the government has on file for a suspect. 180 Some of the fingerprint
may even be visible to the naked eye. 181 DNA analysis, on the other
hand, demands a complicated and technical examination. 182 For
example, polymerase chain reaction analysis uses a minute amount of
cells-sometimes only a few skin cells-to replicate millions of
exact copies of DNA, much like a copy machine. 183

171. See Williamson v. State, 413 Md. 521, 551 n.3, 993 A.2d 626, 644 n.3 (2010) (Bell,
C.J., dissenting).
172. See id.
173. See Joh, supra note 26, at 869-70; Williamson, 413 Md. at 561-65, 993 A.2d at 65053 (Bell, c.J., dissenting); United States v. Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d 630, 657-58 (D.
Md. 2009).
174. See History of Fingerprinting, FINGERPRINTING, http://www.fingerprinting.com
Ihistory-of-fingerprinting.php (last visited Dec. 1,2011).
175. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 842 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004).
176. Mitochondrial analysis can uncover a person's maternal family history, and Ychromosome analysis can trace family history among males. See NAT'L INST. OF
JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 6-7.
177. See Joh, supra note 26, at 858 n.5.
178. See discussion supra Part III.A.I.
179. Williamson v. State, 413 Md. 521, 551 n.3, 993 A.2d 626,644 n.3 (2010) (Bell, C.J.,
dissenting).
180. See United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2004).
181. Jd. at 221.
182. See Williamson, 413 Md. at 562, 993 A.2d at 650 (2010) (Bell, C.J. dissenting);
NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 5-7.
183. See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 6.
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Furthermore, people cannot help but slough naturally shed DNA
everywhere they gO.184 No voluntariness or intention is necessary to
leave a pool of DNA that can mix with others' DNA, creating a
public mess of genetic material. 185 Inherent in leaving a fingerprint,
however, is the voluntary action of pressing a finger on a surface
such that the print can be lifted for comparison. 186 Moreover the
public mishmash of fingerprints is reduced because people clearly
cannot naturally pass their fingerprints to others who then leave the
prints somewhere else. 187
IV. THE SOLUTION: A STATUTE DECLARING A
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN
NATURALLY SHED DNA

A.

Naturally Shed DNA Cannot Be Abandoned

Naturally shed DNA, in the Fourth Amendment context, clearly
presents a unique challenge for courts. 188 People maintain a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the intimate information in their
DNA, and the government conducts a search by collecting and
analyzing naturally shed DNA, implicating the Fourth Amendment. 189
Thus, for the government to take and analyze naturally shed DNA, an
exception to the warrant requirement must apply. 190
Abandonment is a Fourth Amendment exception, and past cases
have held that people abandon DNA by voluntarily and intentionally
putting DNA on an object before abandoning the object, or by
voluntarily and intentionally expelling the DNA in public. 191
Naturally shed DNA, however, is shed involuntarily and
unintentionally.l92 Can a person relinquish privacy expectations in
extremely intimate information that is left without any voluntariness
or intention?

See Grabianowski, supra note 156.
See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
See United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 221-22 (3rd Cir. 2004).
See id.
See discussion supra Part III.
See discussion supra Part lILA.
See discussion supra Part 1I.C.
Williamson v. State, 413 Md. 521, 537-38, 993 A.2d 626, 635-36 (2010);
Commonwealth v. Cabral, 866 N.E.2d 429 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
192. See Grabianowski, supra note 156; United States v. Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d 630,64849 (D. Md. 2009).

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
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The idea is repugnant to the Fourth Amendment and the concept
of abandonment. 193 Abandonment requires an assessment of a
person's actions and intentions to detennine if the person intended to
relinquish privacy rights in an object. 194 If no voluntary action was
taken to discard the object, and there was no intention to discard the
object, it is difficult to imagine how a person could reasonably be
thought to have given up his privacy rights, especially in something
as intimate as DNA. 195 By doing nothing to discard skin cells, the
cells essentially remain part and parcel of a person's body. And
people maintain an extremely high privacy expectation in their
bodies. 196 Thus, taking and analyzing naturally shed DNA without a
warrant is closely akin to the taking and analyzing of a blood sample
without a warrant or warrant exception, an unconstitutional action. 197
The conclusion must be that people maintain a per se reasonable
expectation of privacy in naturally shed DNA. 198 A different
conclusion would open everyone's intimate medical and genetic
infonnation to the government, and because naturally shed DNA is
constantly shed, the government can easily obtain the infonnation. 199
United States v. Daviioo is instructive. In that case, police took as
evidence a shooting victim's blood-covered clothing, stored it for
three years so that the DNA could be analyzed, and used it to convict
the victim for a subsequent shooting. 201 The Government claimed
that the defendant abandoned his clothes and DNA, but the u.s.
District Court for the District of Maryland held otherwise:
Nor does the Court necessarily agree that conscious disposal
of an item, or unconscious shedding of hair, saliva, or
dennal cells, reasonably supports the conclusion that an
individual has manifested an intent to abandon one's privacy
interest in the infonnation that can be gleaned from that item
or tissue by DNA analysis. 202

193. Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 649-50 ("The Court does not believe that intent to abandon
or volition can be inferred from passive inaction .... ").
194. Id. at 648.
195. Id. at 649-50.
196. Schrnerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966).
197. See id.
198. See Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 649-50.
199. See Grabianowski, supra note 156.
200. 657 F. Supp. 2d 630 (D. Md. 2009).
201. Id. at 634-35.
202. Id. at 649-50.
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The defendant in the case was shot, making his situation slightly
different from one involving naturally shed DNA, which is constantly
shed, but the case strongly supports the proposition proposed in this
comment: DNA that leaves one's body without voluntary action or
intent is not automatically abandoned. 203
One might argue that people perform many voluntary actions
when they naturally shed skin cells, even if they do not know they are
shedding those cells. For instance, when a suspect comes in for
police questioning, he voluntarily walks into the interrogation room.
Is that level of voluntariness enough to say that any naturally shed
skin cells in that room have been abandoned? Can tangentiallyrelated actions qualify as the voluntary actions necessary to abandon
DNA?
Where to draw the line could vary depending on the facts of each
case. Surely, a "but for" analysis that finds abandonment if a person
would not have left his DNA but for some prior voluntary action
leading up to the abandonment cannot stand. Under that analysis, all
naturally shed DNA would be abandoned because the shedding could
be tied to some voluntary action, no matter how unrelated. The other
option, a case-by-case approach considering a sort of proximate
voluntariness, similar to the torts concept of proximate causation,
presents problems as well. That approach would again leave DNA
and people's Fourth Amendment rights vulnerable to an
abandonment test that is open to interpretation based on the facts and
the court.
B.

The Solution

Courts have never faced the question of the Fourth Amendment's
applicability to naturally shed DNA.204 Because such DNA contains
extremely private information and is constantly shed, it presents a
unique challenge for courts.z05
A new approach is needed.
Legislatures should enact statutes that declare that people maintain a
per se reasonable expectation of privacy in naturally shed DNA.206
A statute is preferable to a court-made rule because legislatures act
on behalf of, and are accountable to, their citizens. 207 Citizens
currently have no guidance about whether their DNA can be collected

203. Id. at 649.
204. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 8, at 2.
205. See discussion supra Part II1.B.
206. See Joh, supra note 26, at 880-81.
207. See id.
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and analyzed by merely shedding skin cells. 208 Legislatures can clear
up the confusion by enacting statutes. 209 Or if citizens simply want
protection of their naturally shed DNA, legislatures can quickly grant
it. 2\0 But legislative action is the only way in which citizens can have
a direct say in the protection of their genetic information?U "If we
want unrestricted government access to DNA information, . . . that
ought to be the subject of public debate rather than made possible
through means such as analogizing DNA to trash.
Without
meaningful consideration of abandoned DNA, we lose the ability to
protect our genetic information.,,212 Legislatures can act without
waiting for an appellate court to hear the appropriate case and issue a
correct holding.213
Such statutes would also clear up confusion for law enforcement.
With no clear law on the issue, police have no way of knowing if
they can gather and analyze the DNA that everyone naturally sloughs
off all the time, and it is crucial to provide guidance because police
can obtain naturally shed DNA more easily than other types of DNA.
Every public place is brimming with naturally shed DNA that could
aid investigations.
My proposed statute regarding the analysis of naturally shed DNA
would mandate that people have a per se reasonable expectation of
privacy in naturally shed DNA.214 Subsection (a) of the statute would
define "naturally shed DNA" as deoxyribonucleic acid that a person
leaves behind in skin cells that are shed with little or no movement.
The subsection would also define "touch DNA" as deoxyribonucleic
acid that a person intentionally and voluntarily leaves on an object by
intentionally and voluntarily touching that object. Subsection (b)
would make clear that the statute does not apply to touch DNA or
DNA left at crime scenes. By leaving touch DNA voluntarily and
intentionally, people abandon the DNA, and society does not
recognize as reasonable a privacy expectation in such DNA. 215 Any
reasonable privacy expectations in DNA left at crime scenes can be

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See Brief of Appellant, supra note 8, at 2.
See Joh, supra note 26, at 880-81.
See id.
Id.
Id.at883.
See id. at 880-81.
See supra pp. 190-91.
See Joh, supra note 26, at 867; United States v. Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d 630,650 (D.
Md. 2009).
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overridden by existing Fourth Amendment considerations. 216
Subsection (c) would announce the mandate of a per se reasonable
expectation of privacy in naturally shed DNA, requiring the
government to secure a warrant to collect or analyze such DNA.
Subsection (d) would provide the remedy for violating a person's per
se reasonable expectation of privacy in her naturally shed DNA:
exclusion of the DNA evidence from trial. 217
The statute would accommodate for the fact that naturally shed
DNA is constantly sloughed off involuntarily and unintentionally,
and ensure that the government does not intrude, without a warrant,
on the reasonable privacy expectations maintained in naturally shed
DNA. 218
By the same token, the statute would not alter other areas of
abandonment law. DNA left behind at crime scenes would still be
open to warrantless collection and analysis by police because people
generally do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in evidence
left at crime scenes.219
Society would never recognize that
expectation as reasonable.220 That is one reason why narcoticsdetecting dog sniffs are constitutional and some more advanced
technologies are not: the dog sniffs detect only unlawful activity, in
which people do not have a reasonable privacy expectation, whereas
technologies such as thermal imaging can intrude on lawful activity
as well.221
But even if people have a reasonable privacy expectation in DNA
left at crime scenes, perhaps because their activities at the scene were
lawful, that expectation can be overcome. 222 Police have probable
cause to obtain and analyze DNA at crime scenes, and an exigency
216.
217.

218.
219.

220.
221.
222.

See discussion infra notes 221-24.
See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216-17 (1960) (explaining that the rule
excluding evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was intended to
deter the government from committing constitutional violations).
See discussion supra Part III.
See Joh, supra note 26, at 867 ("Courts may readily find that criminals have clearly
intended to renounce all privacy claims to bags containing illegal firearms or to
packages of drug paraphernalia when fleeing the police, but we hardly have a realistic
choice in shedding DNA. One can shred private papers or bum garbage so that no
one may ever delve into them, but leaving DNA in public places cannot be avoided.")
(footnotes omitted); Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 650 ("No one would argue, for
example, that a rapist retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the DNA
contained in the semen that he leaves on his victim. Society considers it reasonable
that if one has committed a crime, any evidence one leaves behind while doing so is
fair game .... ").
See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005).
See id.
See discussion supra Part I1.c.
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exception to the warrant requirement would apply because the DNA
could be contaminated if police take the time to obtain a warrant. 223
In the alternative, the act of committing the crime is enough to make
clear that the criminal is abandoning DNA left at the scene. 224
Committing any crime requires far more intent and action than what
the statute considers for naturally shed DNA, making it reasonable
for society to accept the criminal's abandonment of DNA. 225

v.

CONCLUSION

Courts have never faced the question of whether naturally shed
DNA can be obtained and analyzed without a warrant/ 26 but just as
the Katz Court confronted new technology that could invade people's
privacy like never before, so too must today's courts deal with new,
invasive technology that can analyze a person's DNA with only a few
naturally shed skin cells. 227
DNA analysis is a critical and quickly advancing crime-fighting
too1. 228 When obtained correctly, DNA provides tremendous promise
because it is sufficient on its own to convict criminals and exonerate
the innocent. 229 But DNA analysis also harbors extraordinary
dangers. 230 Because a person sheds cells without any voluntary
action, those cells are still part and parcel of the person, and that
person has not relinquished privacy expectations in the DNA. 231 And
because DNA contains extremely personal information, society
would surely recognize as reasonable a privacy expectation in

223.
224.

225.

See Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 650.
See id. ("[T]he intentional, volitional act of committing the crime itself supports the
theory that the criminal intends to abandon any privacy interest he has in his blood,
fluid, cells, etc. that he may leave behind at the crime scene.").
See id. Admittedly, individuals who are not guilty could leave their DNA at crime
scenes, and by maintaining crime scenes as an exception to the warrant requirement,
police would be free to collect and analyze that DNA. But because society does not
recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in items left at crime scenes, people,
whether guilty or not, have relinquished their right to privacy in crime scene DNA.
See Joh, supra note 26, at 867. Society has conceded that because items at crime
scenes are so likely to be tied to crime, and because fighting crime is a significant
objective of society, the minimal possibility that police may collect and analyze the
DNA of individuals who are not guilty is accepted as collateral damage. See id.
See Brief of Appellant, supra note 8, at 2-3.
See Katz v. United States, 389 u.S. 347, 348 (1967).
See discussion supra Part II.A.

226.
227.
228.
229. Jd.
230. See discussion supra Part III.
231. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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DNA.232 New technology allows police to uncover the mtlmate
infonnation in DNA with only a few naturally shed cells, leaving all
people vulnerable to Fourth Amendment violations.233 Short of
fanatical measures, people can do nothing to keep from leaving a trail
of DNA everywhere they gO.234
Legislatures should not wait for courts to come across the correct
case in the hopes that courts will issue the correct holding. 235 They
should step in to ensure that people receive the Fourth Amendment
protection they deserve in their DNA.236 As Chief Judge Bell of the
Court of Appeals of Maryland stated:
Undoubtedly, there are many crime fighting tools that, if
allowed to be used, without restraint or with minimal
oversight and unrestrained by the Fourth Amendment,
would prove quite effective in detecting and solving crime,
yet would wreak havoc with constitutional rights ....
Surely the framers wanted law enforcement to operate in an
effective and efficient manner; however, they were wise
enough not to adopt a "by any means necessary" stance. In
fact, the means and limitations which law enforcement
utilized to enforce the law did not, and do not, "just matter,"
they became, and remain, key to any well-thought-out legal
analysis and correct exposition of the law regarding the
Fourth Amendment. 237
MODEL STATUTE
Reasonable expectation of privacy in naturally shed DNA
(a) Definitions - In this section the following words have the
meanings indicated.
(1) "Naturally shed DNA" means deoxyribonucleic acid that a
person leaves behind in skin cells that are shed with little or no
movement.

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

See discussion supra Part I1I.B.I.
See discussion supra Part II.A.
See Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 92, at 437-38.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
/d.
State v. Raines, 383 Md. 1,75-76,857 A.2d 19,64 (2004) (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
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(2) "Touch DNA" means deoxyribonucleic acid that a person
intentionally and voluntarily leaves on an object by intentionally and
voluntarily touching that object.
(b) Scope - This section does not apply to the following types of
DNA.
(1) Touch DNA.
(2) DNA at crime scenes.
(c) Prohibited - People maintain a per se reasonable expectation of
privacy in naturally shed DNA. The government cannot collect or
analyze naturally shed DNA without a warrant.
(d) Remedy - If this statute is violated, the DNA evidence must be
excluded from trial.
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